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Abstract: Dillon S. Myer (1891–1982) has been framed as the lone villain in incar-
cerating and dispersing the Japanese Americans during WWII (as director of the War 
Relocation Authority) and terminating and relocating Native American tribes in the 
1950s (as Commissioner of Indian Affairs). This view is almost solely based on the 
1987 biography Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Rac-
ism by Richard Drinnon. Little more has been written about Myer and his views, and 
a comprehensive comparison of the programs is yet to be published. This article com-
pares the aims of the assimilation and relocation policies, especially through Myer’s 
public speeches. They paint a picture of a bureaucrat who was committed to his job, 
who held strongly onto the ideals of Americanization and assimilation, and who saw 
“mainstream” white American culture as something for all to strive after, but who was 
hardly an utter racist.
Keywords: Japanese Americans, Native Americans, assimilation, relocation, Dillon 
S. Myer
Some thirty years ago, historian Richard Drinnon came across an over-
looked connection: Dillon S. Myer, a long-term government civil servant, 
had led both the War Relocation Authority in charge of the incarceration of 
Japanese Americans during World War II and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
during the termination and relocation policies of the 1950s, thus oversee-
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ing the control and dispersal of two ethnic American minorities. Drinnon’s 
research was published as Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer 
and American Racism (1987), in which he framed Myer as a man whose 
actions were primarily guided by his racism.1 This view as well as the no-
tion of Myer as a colorless bureaucrat carrying out President Franklin Roo-
sevelt’s orders, has prevailed in most of the research literature, and little has 
been done to compare the two policies.2
This article compares the resettlement programs that sought to Ameri-
canize the Japanese Americans during their World War II incarceration and 
the assimilation and relocation policies targeting Native Americans in the 
post-war United States.3 While the two groups were very different, the pro-
grams had many similarities. First, white people perceived both groups as 
having inferior cultural traits and pursued their transformation into some-
thing more desirable—that is, their understanding of what it meant to be 
“American.” Second, both programs were led by Dillon S. Myer at signifi-
cant points. 
Dillon Seymour Myer was born in 1891 in Ohio, where he grew up on a 
farm and received a religious upbringing. After earning two university de-
grees, first in agriculture and later in education, Myer held various positions 
as an agricultural expert in several eastern states before his appointment as 
the director of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), an independent civil-
ian agency in charge of incarcerating Japanese Americans in 1942. He was 
preceded in this task by Milton Eisenhower, who led the agency for the first 
few months of its existence. Eisenhower and Myer were colleagues from 
the US Department of Agriculture, and several other higher officials in the 
WRA hailed from that department.4
As the legal scholar Eric Muller has pointed out, in research literature the 
WRA has typically been treated as a separate venture, unconnected to pre-
1 Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1987).
2 See, for example, Kenneth R. Philp, “Dillon S. Myer and the Advent of Termination: 1950–1953,” Western 
Historical Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1988): 37-59.
3 Various stages of research for this article have been financially supported by the Finnish Cultural Founda-
tion, Kone Foundation, and the University of Helsinki Faculty of Arts. The author wishes to thank her 
reviewers for insightful feedback.
4 Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, xxiv–xxv, 12–19, 25; Eric L. Muller, “Of Coercion and Accom-
modation: Looking at Japanese American Imprisonment through a Law Office Window,” Law and History 
Review 35, no. 2 (2017): 171–187.
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vious policies or administrative structures.5 In reality, its officials, including 
those at the top, had extensive experience with leading people. Similarly, 
scholarship has by and large neglected a thorough comparison of the “relo-
cation” programs or the agencies conducting them.6 In addition to sharing 
officials and ideological aims, the programs were executed in similar ways. 
In both cases, “field offices” were established to help the resettlers (those 
relocated away from their former homes) to find employment and housing. 
Japanese and Native American resettlers both had to go through a series of 
interviews to determine their suitability for the programs, and both were 
equipped with instructional pamphlets on how to conduct themselves in 
their new home towns. 
While Myer’s role and character are the subject of Richard Drinnon’s 
study, which depicts him as an out-and-out racist, in this article I aim to 
draw a more balanced interpretation of Dillon S. Myer based mostly on his 
public speeches. I will also touch upon Myer’s correspondence during his 
years in office. The speeches were delivered at a diverse array of venues, 
both by invitation and in talks open to public, and to diverse audiences. At 
times, Myer spoke to an audience already sharing his views, such as the 
Christian organizations at Buck Hill Falls, Pennsylvania, in 1951, while 
at other times the audience consisted of some of the most vocal opponents 
of his goals, as was the case with the American Legion at Indianapolis in 
1943.7
At WRA, Myer was in charge of the ten incarceration camps confining 
120,000 Japanese Americans, the majority of whom were United States cit-
izens. While running the camps, Myer and the WRA became proponents of 
5 Muller, “Of Coercion and Accommodation,” 391–399.
6 Laura Sachiko Fugikawa and Karen Leong have made openings in this direction, but there have been no 
major publications as a result of their research. Leong has co-authored an article focusing on the Gila 
River Indian Community and the Japanese American incarceration camp on their lands. Karen Leong and 
Myla Vicenti Carpio, “Carceral Subjugations: Gila River Indian Community and Incarceration of Japanese 
Americans on Its Lands,” Amerasia Journal 42, no. 1 (2016).
7 Dillon S. Myer speech to Combined Assemblies of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the National 
Council of the Churches of Christ [hereinafter NCCC] at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, December 12, 
1951, 2–4, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group [hereinafter RG] 75, Office of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs [hereinafter OCIA], Commissioner Dillon Myer files [hereinafter DM], Desk 
File: Organizations-Window Rock AO, Box 3; “The Relocation Program,” an address by Dillon S. Myer to 
the State Commanders and State Adjutants of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, November 16, 
1943, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri [hereafter HSTL], Dillon S. Myer papers [herein-
after DSM]. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php.
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dispersing the Japanese Americans across the United States and preventing 
them from forming ethnic communities after the war. When Myer became 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1950, he directed the agency dur-
ing the years that led to the termination and relocation policies with much 
the same aims: removing the special status of native tribes and convincing 
Native Americans to relocate to different parts of the country away from 
reservations.
Japanese Americans and Native Americans before World War II
Many historical and cultural traits kept Japanese Americans and Native 
Americans apart as communities. Large numbers of Japanese immigrants 
began arriving to the United States only at the turn of the twentieth century, 
amidst an increasingly anti-Asian sentiment. Native Americans obviously 
lived on the continent before the first European immigrants, which ren-
ders their status different both on practical and mental levels. The United 
States actually had formal government-to-government relationships with 
dozens of Native American tribes. Negotiations regarding the status of a 
tribe, possible termination, and other issues were thus held between the 
federal government and each tribal government, although on an ideologi-
cal level the US government tended to consider all tribes as coming from 
the same background and conditions. Similarly, upon initiating a program 
of incarceration, the government classified all people of Japanese ancestry 
as hostile aliens, despite the large number of native-born citizens. Being at 
war with Japan meant that there were no direct negotiations between the 
United States and Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals, the 
Issei. Instead, the Spanish consul reported on the affairs of the Issei in the 
incarceration camps.
The Japanese were a relatively homogenous group. Having arrived in the 
United States during the course of just three and a half decades, between 
1890 and 1924, they were also homogenous in terms of age.8 This is particu-
larly true of the second-generation Nisei, most of whom were born between 
1916 and 1930.9 Adding to the homogeneity of the Nisei and the Japanese 
8 Because Japan was isolated, there were few Japanese immigrants in the US prior to 1890. Opposition to 
Japanese immigration led to the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, which effectively put an end to Japanese 
immigration.
9 The Nisei, or second-generation Japanese Americans, David Yoo argues, can truly be treated as a gen-
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Americans in general, most continued to actively speak Japanese and prac-
ticed the Buddhist religion. The Japanese were also racially homogenous, 
because miscegenation laws in California and Oregon prohibited Asians 
(and blacks) from marrying whites until 1948 and 1951, respectively.10
Native Americans, on the other hand, were extremely heterogeneous. 
There existed hundreds of tribes, languages, and religions, and most im-
portantly, Native Americans identified with these tribal units. The feeling 
of pan-Indianism, while not a new phenomenon, only began to manifest 
itself properly during the 1960s. When the termination policy was adopted 
in 1953, some tribes had been influenced by Euro-American expansionist 
politics and civilizing programs for centuries, while others had been con-
fined to reservations for less than eighty years. Their degree of assimilation 
hence varied remarkably across the country. Compared to Japanese Ameri-
cans, much racial mixing had taken place, and only sixty percent of Native 
Americans were classified as “full-blood” in 1940.11
Nevertheless, there were also several similarities in the groups’ pre-war 
conditions. Both mostly lived in communities consisting of members of 
their own race (in the case of Native Americans, more precisely of their 
own tribe).12 They were almost exclusively educated by white Americans 
with Protestant values in mind, although a majority in both groups pro-
fessed some minority religion (namely Buddhism or tribal religions).
eration. As a point of distinction from other minorities, second-generation Japanese Americans not only 
shared the experience of having been born in a country not native to their parents, but they also shared the 
experience of growing up in the same years. David Yoo, Growing up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture 
among Japanese Americans of California, 1924–49 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 3. 
10 It should be noted that there was also strong social pressure in the Japanese American community against 
marrying someone who was not of Japanese origin. Paul Spickard, Japanese Americans: The Formation 
and Transformations of an Ethnic Group, Revised ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 
2008), 35.
11 Alison R. Bernstein, American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 86.
12 The 1940 census found that 89 percent of Japanese Americans lived in the three West Coast states. Al-
though many lived outside the actual urban Japantowns, their networks were often predominantly Japa-
nese. The same year, 75 percent of Native Americans lived in eight Midwestern or Western states, and only 
five percent lived outside reservations throughout the country. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, “Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population, Volume II: Characteristics of 
the Population, Part 1” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 21. Race, of course, is a 
complex and complicated concept, and I acknowledge that the data does not lend itself to straightforward 
interpretation. See, for example, Spickard, Formation and Transformations, 2–7.
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The paths of Japanese Americans and Native Americans crossed during 
World War II. Once President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Or-
der 9066 banning Japanese Americans from the West Coast, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs John Collier proposed to the WRA that Japanese “reloca-
tion camps” be established on Indian lands.13 His vision was that the camps 
would develop reservation lands, thus benefitting Native Americans after 
the incarceration period had ended. He also believed that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) had the necessary experience in dealing with a racial 
minority group. Two of the camps, Poston and Gila River in Arizona, were 
located on lands leased from local native tribes. In the end, however, Native 
Americans benefitted little from leasing their lands to the WRA, aside from 
the rent paid to them. Dillon S. Myer was reluctant to develop surplus land 
for farming, and after the closing of the camps, buildings were torn down 
instead of being handed over to the Native Americans. There was very little 
interaction between the Native Americans and the Japanese, partly because 
Myer emphasized the camps as way stations, and he discouraged the in-
mates from forming ties with local Native Americans since the community 
was meant to be temporary.14
Locked-Up Japanese Americans
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive 
Order 9066, authorizing the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the 
West Coast. Weeks later, he ordered the establishment of the War Reloca-
tion Authority to “look after” the Japanese Americans after their removal. 
Dillon S. Myer took over the WRA in June 1942, after the resignation of its 
first director, Milton Eisenhower.
13 The terminology relating to the eviction of Japanese Americans varied from “evacuation” and “relocation” 
to “concentration.” Most commonly, the incarceration camps were called relocation centers. Today, the 
debate continues over whether these camps should be called internment, incarceration, or concentration 
camps. I have settled with the word “incarceration” and “inmate.” To refer to the process of moving away 
from the camps, contemporary authorities usually used, again, the term “relocation,” but to keep the ter-
minology clear, I use the word “resettlement.” See, for example, Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing 
the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Karen L. 
Ishizuka, Lost & Found: Reclaiming the Japanese American Incarceration (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2006); Karen L. Ishizuka, “What’s in a Word? History, Violence, and Erasure When the Words 
Are ‘Japanese Internment’ and ‘Muslim Registry’,” https://rewire.news/article/2016/11/22/word-history-
japanese-internment/. 
14 Bernstein, American Indians and World War II, 82–85.
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President Roosevelt authorized the actions of the WRA, but he remained 
disinterested in the incarceration or relocation processes and met only once 
with Myer during the war. He let lower-level officials handle publicity is-
sues and would not speak favorably of the inmates, even when other admin-
istrators asked him to do so to demonstrate his support for the WRA policy. 
When Roosevelt finally stepped up to publicly praise the Americanism of 
the inmates, they had been incarcerated for a year and public opposition 
against the Japanese Americans had increased tremendously.15
Although the original purpose of Executive Order 9066 was to quiet anti-
Japanese hysteria, it did the opposite, suggesting to the general public that 
Japanese Americans indeed were suspicious and disloyal. It appeared that 
only confinement would provide a satisfactory solution to the “Japanese 
problem” during the war. This ran contrary to the visions of Milton Eisen-
hower and John Collier to establish planned communities for the inmates.16
Many Congressmen spent the war years drafting plans for the exporta-
tion of all Japanese Americans,17 but most authorities in the field focused on 
the eventual closing of the incarceration camps. Myer, in particular, started 
a strong public campaign for the Americanization of the inmates, particu-
larly the first generation Issei. His promotion of the program consisted of 
two main elements: the undemocratic nature of detaining loyal citizens and 
the harmful impact incarceration had on the Americanism of the inmates. 
His statements were consistently in line with New Deal liberalism, which 
believed in the “common man” and advocated an individual’s right to pur-
sue happiness.18 
The WRA employed anthropologists, or “community analysts,” both in 
Washington and in each of the ten camps. Their task was to generate in-
formation about the functioning of the inmate communities, which in turn 
was to help the government in policy-making. Importantly, as the anthro-
pologist Orin Starn argues, they were also to promote a “positive image” 
15 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 245.
16 Ibid., 130–131.
17 While a few Congressmen throughout the war years spoke in favor of Japanese Americans, their opponents 
dominated the majority of debates.
18 It must, again, be emphasized that the definition of happiness may have been very narrowly defined from 
a white male perspective, but it was, nevertheless, a sound vision of many of these bureaucrats that they 
were “doing the right thing.”
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of incarceration and Japanese Americans.19 Many of them had an academic 
background in acculturation studies and this showed in their analyses.20
The role of these anthropologists should not be underestimated. Although 
their role was not public, and they typically did not represent the WRA out-
side the camps, my analysis of Dillon S. Myer’s speeches shows that there 
were many parallels in the phrases used in anthropologists’ reports and in 
Myer’s public speeches.21 Furthermore, it became evident throughout the 
reading of the archival records that the anthropologists were quite detailed 
in their description of community sentiments, and while they usually re-
frained from making direct recommendations, their thoughts on matters 
such as resettlement, come through in their reports.22
Myer’s arguments and style changed very little during his years in office. 
While he modified his message somewhat depending on his audience, he 
consistently incorporated four topics into almost every speech. Most of-
ten, he began by arguing for the rightfulness of the incarceration decision. 
This was necessary to obtain justification for Myer’s and the WRA’s work 
as such, but later he had to make a much more powerful argument for the 
disbanding of the camps, leading to the three ensuing topics. First, Myer 
explained why the camps were undesirable (if also initially justified), which 
he did by drawing in elements of American principles and ideologies. Then 
followed slightly more practical descriptions of how the Japanese would 
become American. Finally, he concluded by explaining the ways in which 
they could already be considered American. This was not to negate his pre-
vious arguments, but to show that this group of people had lived for decades 
in America and that the power of American society had, indeed, been strong 
enough to mold them toward its ideals. This line of thought also attempted 
to convince white Americans that the camps would stop the positive devel-
opment of the Nisei.
In fact, Myer seemed appalled by the incarceration camps. While he 
called them communities, Myer declared that incarceration camps were 
19 Orin Starn, “Engineering Internment: Anthropologists and the War Relocation Authority,” American Eth-
nologist 13, no. 4 (1986): 702.
20 Ibid., 714.
21 Saara Kekki, “Japanese American Internment: Spectacularization, Americanization, and the Model Minor-
ity Myth” (MA thesis, University of Helsinki, 2009), 29–46.
22 For the anthropologists’ reports, see Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records 1930–1974, 
Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California. Finding aid available through Online Archive of California, http://
oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf5j49n8kh. 
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“undesirable institutions,” where residents lived “an unnatural and un-
American sort of life.” It remains a matter of speculation whether he meant 
that the restriction of freedom was un-American or whether he was more 
concerned about the unusual composition of the camp communities, con-
sisting as they did of Japanese people only. He appealed to his audience to 
remember democratic principles: “Keep in mind that the evacuees were 
charged with nothing except having Japanese ancestors.” Despite speaking 
for the resettlement of inmates from the camps, a fear of disloyal activ-
ity was still present. Myer continued to believe that the “segregation of 
loyal Americans from the disloyal element is essential.”23 This conviction, 
not only of Myer but of most officials and the general public, persisted 
throughout the war and resulted in the designation of the Tule Lake camp 
as a segregation unit.24
Apart from the requested confinement of the “disloyal element,” Myer 
argued against the incarceration of loyal people. He frequently returned to 
the concept of “the American way” to win supporters for resettlement. “The 
American way,” Myer argued, was not to “have children grow up behind 
barbed wire,” under conditions “which make a mockery out of principles 
we have always cherished.” More generally, the American way was to be 
democratic and guarantee equal opportunity to all those who adhered to 
American principles. In the camp environment, such principles were dif-
ficult to maintain. According to Myer, loyalty “cannot flourish in an atmo-
sphere of suspicion and discrimination.”25
Myer, however, had “faith in the American way of life and in the melting 
pot tradition on which this nation has developed.” These principles would 
cause the mainstream to accept the settlement of the Japanese into new 
communities.26 The WRA could not forcefully resettle the inmates into 
23 Myer, “An Anniversary Statement,” March1943, HSTL, DSM. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php
24 The segregation took place after completing a “loyalty questionnaire,” in which inmates were requested to 
swear unqualified allegiance to the United States. Issei found this problematic, because they did not qualify 
for American citizenship, and thus, feared a positive answer would make them stateless if the United States 
were to lose the war and Japan were to re-examine their permission to return to Japan. Many Nisei were 
insulted by the implication that they would be loyal to any other country than that of their birth. As a result, 
about 12,000 people registered a “no” response and were moved to Tule Lake. Of those refusing to swear 
allegiance, over 4,000 were repatriated or expatriated to Japan, although some later returned to the United 
States. Michi Nishiura Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps 
(New York: Morrow, 1976), 260–269.
25 Myer, “Speech over the National Broadcasting Company network,” July 15, 1943, HSTL, DSM.
26 Myer, “The Relocation Program,” November 16, 1943, HSTL, DSM.
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mainstream America or take sole responsibility for educating good Ameri-
cans. Americans themselves must see that it is the right thing to do. Of 
course, Myer acknowledged, “democracy is never an easy form of govern-
ment. […] it can be made to operate successfully only if the people have 
the necessary energy, ingenuity and especially courage to make it work.”27 
This was a subtle hint at the responsibility of the general public to show 
their Americanness. Myer’s images, however, were powerful. In a time of 
war, few people would miss an opportunity to show courage and to do their 
share. Furthermore, Myer scolded certain Americans for discriminating 
against other American citizens merely “for accidents of ancestry,” another 
popular image of his.28 
Myer repeatedly noted that the United States could not keep its citizens 
locked up in camps when the country was involved in a war to stop such 
treatment elsewhere. One of his most powerful statements on appealing 
to democratic ideals he repeated several times: “Let’s not deal with the 
problem as Hitler would handle it under his Nazi regime, or as Tojo would 
deal with it in Japan. Let’s do it in the American way.”29 Herein, he posed 
a strong challenge for Americans: How might they avoid reducing them-
selves to the level of their enemies? The answer, Myer suggested, was that 
the Japanese Americans need and should receive “help” in assimilating.
Rather than emphasizing the rights of the inmates and making them the 
center of focus, he gave the role of the protagonist to mainstream America. 
If the Japanese were kept in the camps until the war was over, Myer said, 
the country would face an enormous problem. The end of the war would 
result in the return of the inmates “to the place they called home—and the 
Little Tokyos would probably spring up again, with all their undesirable 
features.”30 This was in clear contrast to the speeches he made as Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, in which he had emphasized the responsibility of 
Native Americans to improve their conditions and did not seem to worry 
about their returning to reservations.
27 Myer, “The Facts about the War Relocation Authority,” January 21, 1944, HSTL, DSM.
28 Myer, “Relocation Problems and Policies,” March 14, 1944. Later, Myer used the same image at least in 
“Racism and Reason,” October 2, 1944; “A Message from the Director of the War Relocation Authority [to 
evacuees resident in relocation centers],” January 1945, HSTL, DSM.
29 Myer, “March of Time,” June 24, 1943, HSTL, DSM.
30 Myer, “The Truth about Relocation,” August 6, 1943, HSTL, DSM.
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Thus, to justify his call for acceptance of the resettlement program, 
Myer kept reminding his audiences of the founding ideals of the nation. 
Americans must portray their excellence as a nation by tolerating, even 
helping out, all groups in their country. People in need—in this case, the 
Japanese Americans—should be integrated into the greatness of America. 
This, again, was a demonstration of his New Deal liberal ideology—of the 
idea that people deserve the right to pursue the American dream, however 
abstract it may be.
Myer’s statements regarding Americanization and assimilation became 
more frequent as the war progressed. These comments intertwined with 
the rest of Myer’s rhetoric, which aimed at generating a more approving 
climate for the “final relocation” of the inmates. 
He noted that the “almost complete assimilation” of the Japanese Hawai-
ians had encouraged scores of young men to volunteer for the army. In the 
continental United States, however, racism and discrimination had spurred 
negative responses to service. He felt that assimilation was a desirable out-
come for immigrants, but he also admitted that the conditions for assimila-
tion had not been favorable on the mainland.
To counter the assumption of unassimilability as the root of discrimina-
tion against the Japanese Americans, Myer repeatedly argued that viewing 
the American-born Nisei as “Japanese” would be “equivalent to asserting 
that American institutions exercise a less potent influence over the youthful 
mind than the transplanted institutions of the Orient.” To the contrary, Myer 
pledged his faith in American institutions, to which “few human minds can 
be exposed to […] without absorbing the rich heritage of American life.” 
Strong proof of this notion was the fact that the inmates had “reached out” 
to American institutions, such as the Boy Scouts, even “in such an artificial 
atmosphere.”31 This was a very typical view of the WRA officials: that the 
Nisei were highly assimilated, while the Issei were for the most part unas-
similated. 
Nevertheless, while educational programs in the camps promoted Ameri-
canism, Myer argued that they “can never be wholly effective” in a camp 
environment. “The influences that operate every day and every week to 
make us a distinctive people on the face of the globe cannot be reproduced 
within an atmosphere of restriction,” he stated. The purpose of the reloca-
31 Myer, “Problems of Evacuee Resettlement in California,” June 19, 1945, HSTL, DSM.
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tion program was to disperse the population to “other parts of the country, 
where they can be absorbed readily.”32
The job of the WRA, in Myer’s view, was to ease the relocation of Japa-
nese Americans from the centers “into normal communities where they can 
develop into normal men and women.” In this context, Myer continued to 
argue for the potency of American institutions, repeating his earlier criti-
cism of those who thought that “merely because an individual is of Japa-
nese extraction, he is somehow immune to the effect of our public school 
system.”33 
Thus, Myer said, the American public must stop looking for ways in 
which the Japanese are different, and rather embrace their similarity with 
the rest of the Americans. Myer felt that although the resettlement endeavor 
might be difficult, “it is a job that must be accomplished if the American way 
of life is to have real meaning to these people.”34 Eventually, an “American 
in the full sense of the word […] acts with goodwill toward his neighbors, 
makes sacrifices for his country, does the things that he believes help all 
races, creeds and groups to work together and make this a strong nation.”35 
This can be interpreted as a message to Japanese Americans, white Amer-
icans, and foreigners. On the surface, Myer provided a description of a 
“good American,” a description of the Japanese Americans once properly 
assimilated. At the same time, it was a plea to the general public to act in 
an American way, that is, by allowing the inmates to resettle. Finally, it was 
a reminder to outsiders, friends, and enemies alike that the actions of the 
United States are guided by a higher creed and should be taken seriously.
Myer also had a message for the inmates in camps. Instead of “breaking 
their present connections and moving back to their old home communi-
ties,” they should seriously consider moving east.36 Confusingly, however, 
Myer did not explain how their moving across the country would amount 
to retaining all the “present connections” and benefit the inmates in any 
way. Myer’s tendency to simultaneously promote a policy of assimilation 
and Americanization as well as the already extraordinary Americanism of 
32 Myer, “The Truth about Relocation”; “The Relocation Program,” HSTL, DSM.
33 Myer, “Relocation Problems and Policies,” HSTL, DSM.
34 Myer, “One Thousandth of a Nation,” March 23, 1944, HSTL, DSM.
35 Myer, “Racism and Reason,” HSTL, DSM.
36 Myer, “A Message from the Director.”
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the Japanese Americans further confused his argument at this point.37 It is 
as though Myer thought that the “American character” of the Nisei could 
disappear. The large number of citizenship renunciations can be interpreted 
as such—or, as I do, mostly as an expression of frustration and disillusion-
ment with one’s home country.
For years following the war, official Japanese American civil rights orga-
nizations, namely the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), which 
represented the younger generation, viewed Myer as a benefactor who 
saved the inmates by promoting their return to normal life. In 1946, the 
JACL organized a banquet in Myer’s honor, praising him as a “champion of 
human rights and common decency.”38 They viewed Myer as having played 
a crucial role in their eventual resettlement into American life, and the fact 
that after incarceration their status in society slowly began to rise.39
Myer lost his status as the hero of the Japanese Americans during the 
1970s and 1980s redress campaign, and he became one of the main individ-
ual targets of the movement. The third-generation Sansei hardly saw him as 
a benevolent hero, but instead held him responsible for the troubles of the 
Nisei and the disintegration and deprivation of post-war Japanese American 
communities. Myer died in 1982, amidst the hearings of the Commission 
on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, in which the JACL 
was seeking to convict Myer for his role in their incarceration.40
“The Indian Problem”
World War II was also a watershed in Indian–white relations. Native Ameri-
cans were actively involved in the war effort, inevitably leading to increased 
37 Most Nisei were, in fact, extremely Americanized despite their frequent exclusion from mainstream soci-
ety. They had been educated in the American public schools, but their parents were also adamant that they 
assimilate culturally. See, for example, Yoo, Growing up Nisei. 
38 Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans. The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority during 
World War II (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1972), 342. 
39 The JACL was a controversial organization throughout the incarceration years and thereafter. Many felt 
that the organization had sold Japanese American civil rights too cheaply by conceding to incarceration. 
While a good number of people supported the JACL, its stand was by no means universally approved. See, 
for example, Frank S. Emi, “Protest and Resistance: An American Tradition,” in A Matter of Conscience, 
ed. Mike Mackey (Powell: Western History Publications, 2002); Yosh Kuromiya, “The Fourth Option,” 
ibid. 
40 Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, 251–254.
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contact between natives and whites.41 Native American veterans used their 
positive image in the wider American society to emphasize their willing-
ness to become full members. They argued that their status should be im- 
proved; they had been “good enough” to fight the war, and they should be 
“good enough” to own property and enjoy full civil rights.42
The government found in the veterans fertile soil to promote assimila-
tion, and it began making plans to offer work placement for returning veter-
ans. Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Barton Greenwood suggested 
in 1945 that the veterans be moved as far as possible from their original en-
vironment to prevent them from easily returning to the reservations.43 This 
thought of relocating the veterans, and later all other Native Americans, 
coincided and overlapped with the desire to end federal–Indian relations 
altogether, that is, of terminating the special status of Native Americans.
United States Indian policy was expensive to maintain, and all sectors 
of government faced budget cuts after the war. The first two commission-
ers after the reformer John Collier were uncontroversial figures among the 
whites as well as the Native Americans, and they mostly carried out cosmet-
ic changes in Indian affairs.44 Dillon S. Myer, on the other hand, revamped 
the BIA administration in his three years in office, with the administration 
becoming fully committed to termination.45 Bills calling for the change in 
status of individual tribes were passed during Myer’s years in office, but 
termination of all Native Americans tribes was adopted as official policy 
by the United States government (and subsequently by participating tribes) 
shortly after Myer’s term, in August 1953.
Upon becoming Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Myer received the cus-
tomary congratulatory letters from former colleagues and several Native 
Americans tribes. Japanese Americans approached him to express their 
encouragement and confidence in him. Reverend Daisuke Kitagawa was 
41 There were nearly 22,000 Native Americans serving in the US military in 1944, and some 40,000 found 
wartime jobs outside reservations. Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government 
and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 337; Bernstein, American Indi-
ans and World War II, 68. 
42 Donald Lee Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960 (Albuquerque: Uni-
versity of New Mexico Press, 1990), 14. 
43 Ibid., 134. This request is very similar to those made by the authorities in the case of the Japanese Ameri-
cans. See, for example, Dillon S. Myer, “The Truth about Relocation,” HSTL, DSM.
44 John Collier was Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1933–1945. 
45 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 135; Prucha, The Great Father, 341. 
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pleased that “at long last something really creative will be done with Amer-
ican Indian people.”46 Mrs. Earl Tanbara wrote that Japanese Americans 
“know in part life on a reservation.” She further complimented Myer for 
his work as director of the War Relocation Authority: “After your outstand-
ing work in relocating us from the Pacific Coast, we know that […] you 
will do a courageous piece of work in helping solve our Indian problem.”47 
These statements to Myer demonstrate that the Japanese no longer con-
sidered themselves a problem, but identified the Native Americans as still 
being one.
Myer identified land ownership as the main problem in Indian affairs. 
He claimed that the federal government was partly responsible for the is-
sue, because Indian policy had always sought to make Indians into farm-
ers and ranchers. This had tied them “to the land perhaps more closely 
than any other segment of our population.” In some areas, they had been 
“outstandingly successful,” but at the same time, such a policy prevented 
those uninterested in farming from moving away from reservations.48 In 
this sense, Myer and John Collier’s views were quite similar. They differed, 
however, in their stand on tribal governments. Collier believed that adjust-
ment to mainstream society could only take place through group, or tribal, 
processes. Myer, on the other hand, felt that tribal governments and the 
specific services aimed at Native Americans stifled the tribes’ development 
toward independence and segregated them from the rest of the society.49 
This hindered their chances of becoming middle-class Americans and “re-
alizing their full potentialities.”50 
46 Daisuke Kitagawa to Dillon S. Myer, April 4, 1950, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: Congratulations-Musk-
ogee AO, Box 2, Folder 1: Congratulations & Misc. Personal. Daisuke Kitagawa was a Japan-born Epis-
copalian reverend, who became a prominent spiritual leader among the Japanese Americans particularly 
during incarceration. 
47 Mrs. Earl Tanbara to Dillon S. Myer, April 14, 1950, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: Organizations-Window 
Rock AO, Box 3, Folder 1: Organizations interested in Indians.
48 Dillon S. Myer speech to Combined Assemblies of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the NCCC 
at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, December 12, 1951, 2–4, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: Organizations-
Window Rock AO, Box 3.
49 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 72; Prucha, The Great Father, 335. Under Collier’s commissioner-
ship, the BIA had introduced tribal governments as ways to communicate with the tribes. Later scholar-
ship has, however, noted that tribal governments were entirely set up in accordance with white American 
perceptions of government. This caused friction in many tribes, as traditional leadership structures were 
artificially changed.
50 Dillon S. Myer speech to Combined Assemblies of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the NCCC 
at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, December 12, 1951, 2–4, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: Organizations-
Window Rock AO, Box 3.
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In a post-career oral history interview, Myer drew a distinction between 
US policies before the 1920s and those in subsequent decades, strongly 
identifying with the latter and dismissing the aims and results of the former. 
He was of the opinion that practically nothing of use had been done to “stop 
 
the exploitation” of Native Americans and to provide them with proper edu-
cation and means to assimilate.51 
To tackle the problems, Myer argued that the BIA should help Native 
Americans leave the reservations and take up other jobs besides those re-
lated to the land. The aid consisted of two parts. The first was a program 
of training and placement assistance for those who wanted to leave the res-
ervations, while the second entailed giving guidance to those who wanted 
to remain on the reservations to start developing industrial programs. The 
programs were quite similar to the leave programs implemented in the Jap-
anese American incarceration camps, and Myer is said to have modeled 
his Indian relocation program after that of the Japanese Americans, con-
vinced of its ultimate success.52 Both programs comprised various steps to 
determine the applicant’s suitability, including applications and interviews. 
Authorities helped in finding jobs and housing and usually gave financial 
support during the first weeks. Both programs also included instruction 
manuals and classes for the relocatees.53 
In his BIA-era speeches, Myer continued to appeal to his listeners with 
imagery of working together, familiar from his WRA speeches. His rhetoric 
was subtler, however. He made fewer direct references to American ide-
als, rather only alluding to them. For instance, in one of his first speeches, 
51 Dillon S. Myer, “Oral History Interview with Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, 1942-
1946; President, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, 1947-50; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1950-53,” 
interview by Helen S. Pryor, University of California Bancroft Library/Berkeley Regional Oral History 
Office, 286–287, quote on page 287, https://www.trumanlibrary. org/oralhist/myerds.htm.
52 Kenneth R. Philp, “Stride toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Cities, 1952–1960,” The Western 
Historical Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1985): 179; Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 66–67. A leave program 
of sorts was also implemented at an earlier stage of handling Native American affairs. Already in the late 
nineteenth century, the US authorities, more precisely Director Captain Richard Henry Pratt of Carlisle In-
dian School, developed an “outing system” designed to send Native American students outside the board-
ing school to work for white employers. This practice spread to other Native American schools as well, 
as it was seen as an effective way of re-enforcing skills and Americanism learned at school. See Michael 
C. Coleman, American Indians, the Irish, and Government Schooling: A Comparative Study (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 128. 
53 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 136. 
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given to the National Congress of the American Indian (NCAI), he said 
“One of my deepest concerns is that the Indians of the United States shall 
participate in shaping the answers to the problems that confront them and 
aid in determining the rules that guide them in their relationship with the 
Federal Government.”54 While this statement clearly suggests that Myer 
wanted Native Americans to be involved in policy-making, he also referred 
to one classic American ideal: self-reliance, every man for himself. Speak-
ing to Christian organizations, Myer summed up the purpose of the reloca-
tion program and his personal ideals very powerfully: “[…] provide the in-
stitutionalized Indian youngsters with the kind of home and community life 
they need if they are to grow up as self-reliant and civic-minded American 
citizens.”55 In addition to suggesting that reservation life resulted in a form 
of institutionalization, Myer could be interpreted as promoting the closure 
of Native American boarding schools in favor of foster care and adoption. 
There is, however, no direct reference to such thinking in any of Myer’s 
speeches, and the federal Indian Adoption Project was initiated only after 
Myer’s time at the BIA, in 1958.56
Being self-reliant and civic-minded were key to how Myer characterized 
good citizenship, but this sentence entails plenty of evaluation and criticism 
of Indian affairs and Native American communities. Indian policy, with its 
reservations and services provided only for Native Americans, had caused 
reservation life to become more or less institutionalized—despite the fact 
that reservations were in theory communities that people could move into 
and out of rather freely. This perception is similar to what Myer had said 
about the Japanese American incarceration camps. At the same time, he 
hinted at disapproval of Native American home and community life, which 
shows he did not understand the cultures he was dealing with. While many 
Native American communities in the 1950s suffered from poverty, illness-
es, and alcoholism, they continued to be traditionally tightly-knit. Strong 
and extensive family networks only began to break down more decisively 
once the relocation program started to impact the various communities.
54 “Statement of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon S. Myer before the National Congress of Ameri-
can Indians,” Bellingham, WA, August 29, 1950, 1 [hereinafter NCAI 1950], RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, 
Folder: Speeches.
55 Address by Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, before the Combined Assemblies of the Divi-
sion of Christian Life and Work of the NCCC, Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, December 12, 1951, 9. See 
also Address of Commissioner D. S. Myer to Navajo Tribal Council, September 13, 1950, RG75, OCIA, 
DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches.
56 The author wishes to thank her anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative interpretation.
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While Myer frequently emphasized that the purpose of the programs 
was to improve the health and financial status of Native Americans, he oc-
casionally suggested areas in which they themselves needed to make im-
provements. Often his views were belittling and paternalistic: “And as they 
move to take their places by the side of their fellow-Americans they will 
learn the techniques and procedures of providing for themselves and of liv-
ing more adequately in our fast-changing industrial civilization.”57 Myer 
probably wanted to say that the BIA programs would elevate Native Ameri-
cans to a new standard of living, but he also blatantly stated that they were 
indeed wards of the government, incapable of taking care of themselves 
without assistance.
The termination policy and particularly the relocation policy have usu-
ally been taken as examples of assimilationism. In many ways, however, 
Myer and the BIA seemed to have been more focused on the task of cutting 
government responsibility in Indian affairs. The policies were meant to per-
suade Native Americans to move away from reservations in order to ensure 
a higher standard of living, but already in 1951 Myer acknowledged that 
not everyone would want to move, and so BIA “policies and our program-
ming must necessarily be broad enough to meet the needs of both types 
of Indian people.” He also claimed to be impressed by “the tremendous 
diversity […] among the several Indian tribes and groups.”58 This suggests 
a rather tolerant view of Native Americans, an appreciation of the fact that 
the various tribes and groups are different.
This tolerance was not only a tactic employed directly toward the Native 
Americans. Speaking to a convention of Christians, Myer expressed his 
hope that church organizations would help accommodate Native Ameri-
cans in their transition to urban life: “They will need help in finding suit-
able meeting places for recreational and community activities. They need 
to know how they can find other Indians who may be in the community.”59 
It is remarkable that Myer talks about the right and significance of finding 
new Indian networks for people he is trying to make less Indian. In my 
interpretation, this does not mean that Myer was proposing segregation, 
57 Myer, NCAI 1950, 3, RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches.
58 Address by Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, at the Eighth Annual Convention of the Na-
tional Congress of American Indians, St. Paul, Minnesota, July 25, 1951 [hereinafter NCAI 1951], 11; 13, 
RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches.
59 Myer, NCCC, 6, RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches.
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because at the same time he talked about incorporating Native Americans 
into existing Boy Scout groups and other institutions. In conducting his 
WRA policy, Myer always emphasized that Japanese Americans should not 
“congregate” in their new hometowns. This change may be proof that he 
had learned from experience that ethnic organizations in fact helped in the 
adjustment phase and eventual assimilation.
It appears that Myer and the rest of the administration and politicians 
saw the dissolving of reservations and tribes as their main goals. Native 
American cultures would be tolerated, if only Native Americans themselves 
would become more individualistic:
So one of the biggest problems facing the Government is to assist the Indian in moving 
into the main stream of American life and breaking that pattern of isolation. Reservation 
life leads to a continuation of certain old ways of life and nowadays leads to a welfare 
type of state for the simple reason that there is not enough work available in many of the 
reservation areas. So poverty, problems of relocation, problems of education, problems 
of health and sanitation all go more or less hand in hand.1 
This is the most personal of Myer’s statements. Although the official policy 
sought also to create jobs on the reservations to support those who were not 
willing to move, Myer clearly thought that the root of the problems lay in 
the existence and structures of reservations. 
In the context of more than a hundred years of assimilationist Indian poli-
cy, Myer’s views hardly stand out. The whites of the early twentieth century 
believed that Native Americans as a race would become extinct, and Myer 
continued to believe in the demise of their cultures: “I think the Indians are 
on the way out as a separate or isolated people, but it may take hundreds of 
years.” He also made a prediction on the future of Native American cultures 
that was proven wrong mere decades later: “The old rites that were prac-
ticed by the Indians in initiating young men into the tribe are going out of 
existence pretty fast. […] I am sure that this problem of loss of interest on 
the part of the young people and maintaining the old rites is going to be a 
factor in the integration process.”2 In the twenty-first  century, we have on 
1 Memorandum to Bureau of Indian Affairs, March 20, 1953. Quoted in Myer, “Oral History Interview with 
Dillon S. Myer,” 290.
2 Ibid. Myer’s use of the word “problem” refers to his discussions with Pueblo elders, who saw the lack of 
interest as a problem.
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the contrary seen the rebirth of many Native American traditions and rites. 
On the one hand, this might be interpreted as the failure of BIA policies, but 
on the other it also speaks for a change in society. Hybrid identities have 
become more acceptable, both for society at large and for many individuals, 
which manifests itself in the re-adoption of near-forgotten cultural forms.
Compared to his role in the War Relocation Authority, Myer did not have 
to justify his position as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The perception of 
an existing Indian problem was widespread across the administration and 
the general public, and it had to be solved. In similar fashion as with the 
WRA, however, Myer’s duty was, once again, to make an office redundant. 
In the case of the WRA, he succeeded, both because the Supreme Court 
ordered the closure of camps and because the WRA worked to get inmates 
out of the camps. With Indian affairs, however, the task was too big to be 
carried out within a short period of time, and in less than ten years the po-
litical atmosphere changed to support a subtler policy.3
Myer seems to have failed to grasp the extent of his termination and re-
location efforts. The relocation of Japanese Americans—whether it should 
be considered a success or not—was theoretically much easier. They were 
a relatively homogenous group (at least culturally) of less than 120,000 
people, who had been brought in ten clearly confined camps. It was much 
easier to track the movements of these people, and, on the other hand, to 
convince them of the need for relocation, because life away from the camps 
was guaranteed to offer the inmates at least more civil rights than their pres-
ent confinement. Meanwhile, Native Americans were an artificially labeled 
group of some 350,000 people, who lived across the country on reservation 
lands guaranteed to them by treaties with the government.4 Upon being ap-
pointed commissioner, Myer set out to make the BIA redundant, but what 
he in fact accomplished was almost a tripling of the bureau’s annual expen-
diture, and the trend continued throughout the 1950s.5 
3 Undoubtedly the change also had to do with the fact that termination was not as easily carried out as had 
been hoped. 
4 By artificially labeled, I mean that until the relocation program, Native Americans had mostly identified 
with their respective tribes, not so much as “Indians.” 
5 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 73, 175–176.
Dillon S. Myer and His Legacy
Dillon S. Myer was a controversial figure among his coworkers and the 
public throughout his career. For Japanese Americans, he was first viewed 
as a hero, then as a villain. White Americans accused him of coddling the 
Japanese inmates, an accusation that was often applied also to Indian Af-
fairs in general. Later scholarship has either labeled him a colorless bureau-
crat or a cold-hearted racist.
Myer himself seemed a supporter of the former image. In his 1970 oral 
history interview, he recounted detailed facts of his long career, but pro-
vides little analysis of the reasoning behind or the consequences of his ac-
tions. For him, his work consisted of a series of problems that had arisen be-
fore his time in office, which he tackled in the most efficient way possible.6
Myer offered only one additional personal reflection on Native Ameri-
cans in the almost 400 pages of interview. In it, he concludes that he hopes 
that Native Americans “will be emerging as active people in politics, as 
lawyers and doctors and professional people of various types, because 
nowadays many of them are going to the same schools as white people are, 
and they are getting the opportunity to go to college.”7 This quotation yet 
again demonstrates Meyer’s belief in his own “benevolence” and that he 
was helping his clients integrate.
In relation to Japanese American incarceration, Myer had little choice 
besides refusing outright his appointment as director of the WRA. Japanese 
Americans had been incarcerated by legislation, and his opportunities for 
changing the situation or conditions in the camps were limited. As Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, he spent three years as part of the long history 
of solving the unavoidable “Native American problem.” At the BIA, too, 
he was constrained not only by the prevalent ideology, but also by his-
tory. Long before Myer’s time, it had become impossible to ignore Native 
Americans. 
Nothing indicates that Myer supported the segregation or different treat-
ment of Native Americans or Japanese Americans from that of white Amer-
icans. Furthermore, he did not suggest that these minorities were inherently 
or racially inferior, contrary to many statements made in Congress at the 
time. Yet there is no doubt that Myer viewed white American culture as the 
most desirable form of culture, one to be attained by everyone.
6 Myer, “Oral History Interview with Dillon S. Myer.”
7 Ibid., 288.
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In the context of this study, it is useless to argue either for or against the 
general policy of assimilation. It had been the official, widely accepted, 
policy, especially with respect to Native Americans, already since the mid-
nineteenth century, and it continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s.8 In 
other words, it was not extraordinary to desire the assimilation of either 
the Japanese Americans or the Native Americans. Had Myer been deeply 
racist, he probably would have been able to achieve a higher turnout for the 
voluntary expatriation of inmates.9 His Native American policies, further-
more, seem to have been driven mostly by financial reasons.
Rather than being racially motivated, Myer’s rhetoric was paternalistic: he 
believed that his agency and his fellow white Americans had an obligation to 
“help” his subjects to become “better” Americans.10 While a certain degree of 
racial superiority is obvious in such thinking, I would rather call it ignorance 
than racism. Most significantly, Myer’s public discourse was remarkably less 
racist than that of, for example, many Congressmen. In my interpretation, he 
was a product of his time rather than the main villain. He had an established 
notion of what it was to be an American, and he wanted to enable many 
people to become part of it: “I have some experience with the problems of 
minorities in our country and I know that their finest hopes and aspirations 
are as truly in the American tradition as those of the rest of us.”11
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